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1 Introduction
Legislative quotas, including for women, have
been in operation in Sudan in one form or
another for decades. However, women’s access to
parliament remained weak throughout the
country’s post-independence period and they
have struggled to find ways to break through the
historical patterns of male dominance that have
largely excluded them from parliament, and
which has kept them on the receiving end of laws
and policies that have frequently marginalised
and excluded them.
With the signing in 2005 of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the
country entered a new phase in its history. The
agreement not only ended Africa’s longest
running civil war, and one of its bloodiest, but
also set the ground for a return to multi-party
elections which had eluded the country for nearly
two decades. This article examines the period
immediately leading up to and following the
signature of the agreement from the perspective
of the Sudanese women’s movement in northern
Sudan, which saw the agreement as representing
a political moment apt for intensive mobilisation
for a quota. The women’s movement’s efforts
contributed to the enactment in 2008 of a 25 per
cent quota for women in National Assembly
(parliament) and Legislative Councils.1
Although quotas per se are not a new
phenomenon in Sudan, the 2008 quota
represents an important break with the past.
Traditionally, women were either appointed to
parliament under military regimes or won (very
few) seats in periods of multi-party democracy
through specially designated ‘graduate
constituencies’. These were seats reserved for
urban professional groups unlikely to enter
parliament given the dominance in the ballot
box of the traditional sectarian parties, such as
the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP), the political wings of the Ansar and
Khatmiyya sects whose bases were
overwhelmingly rural and conservative (El-
Battahani 2002). The 2008 quota is unique in
that it not only targets women’s representation
specifically, but also seeks to guarantee it under
conditions of multi-party democracy. Through
examining the ways in which the women’s
movement in northern Sudan mobilised for the
quota and divisions within the movement itself
that ultimately impacted the form the quota
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took, this article seeks to draw some lessons from
the experience and to offer some preliminary
thoughts on the quota’s implementation in the
2010 elections.
2 Lessons of the Sudanese Political Women’s
Movement: 1965–2005
The women’s movement in Sudan has a rich
political history that predates the country’s
independence in 1956. The first primary school
for girls opened its doors in 1906 in Rufaa town
under the leadership of Sheikh Babiker Badri,
and in the ensuing years, a women’s movement
would be borne out of the national struggle
against colonialism (Abdel-Al 1997). Formal
women’s organisations began to emerge starting
in 1946, as the national struggle, led by trade
unions, intensified against colonial authorities.
Nurses were the first to break through cultural
and colonial restrictions on women’s
participation in public life, taking part, in 1948
for the first time, in street demonstrations. The
decisive moment in the history of the movement
came with the formation of the Sudanese
Women’s Union (SWU) in 1952. In the
beginning, the SWU did not have increasing
women’s political participation as a goal, its focus
rested on health, education and labour issues
(such as reducing female illiteracy, alleviating
harmful practices affecting girls, ending
discrimination in pay and increasing access to
the labour market). With the 1953 elections
looming, which were seen as a precursor to
independence, SWU quickly entered the political
sphere, agitating for women’s right to vote, and
making a breakthrough almost immediately
when educated women (with a minimum of a
secondary school certificate) were allowed to vote
in graduate constituencies. In total, 15 women
voted in that year’s elections (Abdel-Al 1997).
SWU continued to build momentum, and by
1965, was regarded as a successful women-led
grassroots organisation and a pioneer in the
region. SWU was 15,000 members strong with
local branches in various parts of the country. It
held public demonstrations that challenged
women’s relegation to the home, and secured
critical gains for Sudanese women, including the
right to equal pay, maternity leave, and universal
suffrage (1965). Respect for the SWU as a force
within Sudanese political life had grown for the
role that it played in mobilising women for the
overthrow of the Abboud military regime in
1964, heralding a brief yet significant period of
democracy in the country’s history (1964–9), and
one in which civil society and civic participation
flourished. SWU’s president at the time, Fatima
Ahmed Ibrahim, became the first woman elected
to parliament in 1965, a feat she achieved by
running a campaign in a graduate constituency.
However, she was the only one, and the women’s
movement realised that gains would not be made
without changes to the political parties
themselves, beginning soon after to engage party
leadership and to build women’s sectors within
political parties themselves.
The 1968 general elections propelled a painful
process of lesson-learning within the movement,
which directly influenced the strategies that
culminated in the 2008 quota. The elections saw
the elimination of graduate constituencies,
which was the only electoral pathway for women
to parliament. With the graduate constituencies
gone, political parties did not put forward women
candidates in geographic constituencies, focusing
their efforts in mobilising women to vote for
male candidates instead. In that, they were
successful: in some constituencies women
outnumbered men in registration, and women
voted in a similar proportion to men (72 per cent
vs. 74 per cent) (Abdel-Al 1997). Thus, Sudanese
women gained as voters but retreated as
candidates, an experience that would influence
the thinking of political parties who began
viewing women as a critical voting block but not
one which required representation in the
nomination lists. The resistance of parties to
nominate women unless special measures were
put in place that did not cut into ‘standard’ party
seats, was the first lesson of the Sudanese
women’s movement on the road to the quota.
The second lesson came with the seizure of power
by Jafar Nimeri soon after the 1968 elections,
which ushered in a decade and a half of military
dictatorship. Nimeri was a believer in social re-
engineering. Totalitarian or not, women would be
better represented in his parliament than under
any previous government. He reserved 40 per
cent of the seats in the National People’s
Assembly for women, professionals (which could
of course include women), the armed forces, the
business community and other groups that the
regime saw as critical in combating the
stranglehold of the traditional sectarian parties
on rural psyches. Political representation was also
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accompanied with political repression on the
streets as women’s organisations became subject
to banning, encroachment and attempted co-
option. The SWU would enter a difficult phase in
its history from which it would never fully recover,
with some members abandoning it and aligning
themselves with the ruling regime, renaming
themselves ‘the socialist union’, while the
remainder retained the old name and maintained
their opposition to the regime (Abdel-Al 1997).
The return to multi-party rule in 1985 and multi-
party elections in 1986 would remind the
women’s movement of the lessons of the 1960s.
Graduate constituencies were reinstated, and as
before, they represented the main opening to
women.2 In all, only one woman ran in a
geographical constituency and only five in
graduate constituencies, with two of the latter
winning seats. As voters however, women turned
out en masse, and in unprecedented numbers.
Nimat Kuku (2009) writes of the lessons of this
period:
What has been noticeable is that women’s
push in political work did not result in
increased numbers of women in parliament.
The problem manifested itself in the
inadequate number of nominees on the one
hand and on the other their absence from
‘safe districts’ and the top of the graduate
constituency lists. The other lesson was that
women who went into parliament in the 65
and 86 elections went through lists and not
geographic constituencies, and for certain
parties and not others. In fact the largest
representation for women was achieved
through reserved seats guaranteed by the
constitution of 1973 and subsequent election
laws during the May [Nimeri] regime, thus
through quotas.
Multi-party rule, as had been the case throughout
Sudan’s modern history, was short-lived. The coup
of 1989 brought the National Islamic Front (the
‘Salvation’ regime) to power and ushered in the
most fractious political phase yet. Like Nimeri, the
Salvationists attempted social re-engineering,
which they called the ‘civilization project’, and
women were one of the project’s main targets for
civilizing. The banning of political parties, trade
unions, professional associations, and student
groups accompanied restrictions on women’s lives
under a conservative interpretation of sharia law.
The Islamist political tradition in Sudan,
influenced by the charismatic Sheikh Hassan Al-
Turabi, had always seen a political role for women.
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Table 1 Representation of men and women in parliament
Year Number of seats Number of seats (men) Number of seats (women) Percentage of women (%)
1965 171 170 1 6
1968 261 261 0 –
1972 265 252 13 5.1
1974 261 250 11 4.4
1978 318 300 17 5.6
1980 386 368 18 4.9
1982 165 154 11 7
1992–96 200 180 20 10
1986 303 301 2 0.7
1994 284 258 26 9.2
1996 421 400 21 5
2001 385 350 35 7
2005* 450 369 81 18
*Transitional parliament, appointed following signature of the CPA.
Source Teks (2008).
The regime was thus less interested in excluding
women per se from power, rather in excluding
women associated with the opposition. It began
eliminating existing women’s organisations and set
up its own structures, most notably, the Sudanese
Women’s General Union (SWGU), a state-
supported organisation with a leadership hand-
picked by the ruling party. True to the Sudanese
trend of higher parliamentary representation of
women under dictatorships, the regime appointed
a sizeable number of women to its various
parliaments (see Table 1).3 The highest proportion
(18 per cent) would only come after the signature
of the CPA however, through appointment (mostly
by the NCP but also the SPLM) to the transitional
National Assembly in 2005.
The early years of the Salvation regime also saw
in an intensification of the civil war in the South.
The conflict further spread to the eastern region
of the country when northern opposition groups,
including the DUP and Umma Party, aligned
themselves with the SPLM, and launched attacks
on government targets from neighbouring
Eritrea. Political openings only came after a
major split within the ruling party in the late
1990s, from which the President, Omar Hassan
Al-Bashir emerged victorious, and which helped
bring a new openness to engagement with other
political forces in the country. At first, the
dialogue was tentatively extended to the main
northern parties, many of which were allowed to
register again. Soon, the NCP was speaking to its
biggest foe, the SPLM, laying the ground for the
negotiations that would lead to a historical peace
agreement in 2005.
3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement:
negotiating peace
The quota had been an issue that surfaced in the
1990s fleetingly propelled by Sudanese women’s
participation in the Beijing summit who lobbied
the national Democratic Alliance and other
political forums. But political reform seemed
distant then. The first sign that a peace
agreement was imminent was the Machakos
Protocol, which was signed in 2002 between the
NCP and the SPLM, providing a framework for
the CPA. Northern and southern women’s groups
began to mobilise, seeing that political reform
was near but unclear what shape it would take,
and with limited access to the negotiations. Most
notably, the Sudanese Women’s Empowerment
for Peace (SuWEP) group – an alliance of
northern and southern women activists – were
early to act, presenting their vision for women’s
rights in a peace agreement, including a quota.
Women in southern Sudan, conscious that any
agreement signed by the SPLM would contain a
large degree of autonomy for southern Sudan,
were agitating for a similar provision. But as
with their counterparts in the North, they were
undermined by a patriarchal political culture
that resisted the inclusion of their voices. As
Anne Itto (2006), a political activist from
southern Sudan, has written:
The SPLM/A leadership nominated a handful
of women leaders as members of the
delegation to Machakos and subsequent
rounds of negotiations. However, this did not
necessarily enable their strong participation:
the women were often co-opted to these
delegations at short notice with very little
opportunity to consult with each other and
develop a women’s peace agenda; they were
expected to contribute to the overall party
position, which was gender-blind to begin
with; and they were always a minority, ill-
prepared for debates with seasoned politicians
who ridiculed or intimidated anyone who
dared to spend much time on gender issues.
One of the first issues the women in the South put
forward was a 25 per cent quota. This was
summarily dismissed by a senior member of the
SPLM, and then an all-male SPLM committee
reduced the figure to 5 per cent, with the SPLM
chairman raising it to 10 per cent. ‘Later on’,
writes Itto, ‘we learned that it had been dropped
altogether when government negotiators refused
a quota for women in power sharing on the
grounds that they had not been fighting women’
(2006). The negotiations were thus a painful
experience for women, whom the war had affected
disproportionately, and many, such as Itto herself,
had been long engaged in the struggle.
In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), otherwise known as the
Naivasha protocols, was finally signed, without a
quota provision. Although representing the most
important political opening in Sudan in at least a
decade and a half, the CPA had several flaws that
would come back to haunt it. The first and most
important was that it was a bilateral
arrangement between two political groups to the
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exclusion of others. It was assumed that the NCP
represented the North and the SPLM the South,
when in fact there was sizeable political
opposition in the country, particularly to the
former. The agreement also assumed that
resolving wealth and power inequities between
the North and South would bring stability to the
rest of the country. The outbreak of another
violent conflict in the Darfur region of western
Sudan (in the ‘North’) as the agreement was
being negotiated belied the assumption that the
North formed an ethnically, religiously and
linguistically homogenous group, and that
systematic underdevelopment was a problem that
only affected the South. Itto points out that the
CPA was also an overwhelmingly male driven
affair with power sharing interpreted as dividing
government posts among parties to the conflict,
namely the SPLM and the NCP. Nevertheless, the
recognition of rights as the basis of citizenship
regardless of religion, ethnicity, and gender and
the key milestones the CPA set on the road to
peace – namely constitutional reform and multi-
party elections – gave activists an opening. ‘We
focused everything on the coming transitional
constitution,’4 says Tayseer El-Nourani, a political
party activist and women’s rights advocate.
4 Constitutional and legal reform – a closed
process
One of the first institutions created by the CPA
was the National Constitutional Commission,
tasked with drafting an Interim National
Constitution (INC). Southern Sudan would have
its own interim constitution as well, in addition to
new state constitutions for the newly redrawn 25
states (15 in the North and ten in the South.) The
period following the CPA saw a great deal of
effort by women’s groups, most notably the
Political Party Women’s Forum which had formed
in Khartoum in 2004, to mobilise around the
quota. Keen to avoid a repeat of the exclusion
women faced during the peace negotiations, this
group amongst others attempted to act quickly so
as to influence the constitutional and legal
reform processes set to take place.
The issues at first centred on what percentage to
go for, with most in the North advocating for the
Beijing Platform recommendation of 30 per cent.
However, 25 per cent was the percentage
acceptable to several prominent parties, including
the NCP. SPLM women were also committed to
that figure, which they had put forward on the
negotiating table in Naivasha. Given the fact that
power lay in the hands of the two parties to
Naivasha, the 25 per cent soon gained traction. As
the battle for the law heated up, and more
pressure developed on women’s groups to decide
not only how much to go for but what form the
quota should take, fissures began to resurface
within the movement. Nourani notes:
The Sudanese women’s movement [in
northern Sudan] is split into two: opposition
and government … when it comes down to it,
the perspective of women affiliated with the
government is different from that of women
in the opposition – even though there could be
issues in common. We have a problem because
our mentality in the opposition is that of our
parties and because their mentality is that of
their party which is ruling.5
With female political activists from outside the
NCP having little access to the constitutional
panel tasked with drafting the document, they
attempted to influence it to the full extent
possible from outside through various means: by
engaging the media, through protests and the
submission of a memo to the constitutional
review panel outlining their vision. They failed
however to push this vision through, as the
constitution, like the CPA, was adopted without
any mention of the quota. The constitution did
however depart from previous ones in one
important way – not only did it have a relatively
strong and supportive stance on women’s rights,
but it also contained, critically, a provision for
affirmative action in favour of women. In what
way that affirmative action would be applied was
left open. Overall, the activists who had lobbied
for the quota felt that they had lost another
battle.6 Feelings of failure in the North were
compounded by the success in the South in
incorporating a 25 per cent provision in the
South Sudan Interim Constitution, not only in all
of the Government of South Sudan’s legislative
bodies but in its executive structures as well.
NCP activists argued, however, that the omission
of the quota from the Interim National
Constitution was not a failure, rather a
deliberate strategy. As Afaf Ahmad Abdel-
Rahman Mohamed, a senior member of the NCP,
former parliamentarian, and member of the
constitutional panel explained, the idea was to
arrive at a wording that would guarantee the
most flexibility and possibilities for change.7
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With the constitutional battle proving indecisive
but leaving the door open for the quota, women
activists soon realised that the electoral laws
would be the final battleground. The fissures
within the movement widened during the three
years between the enactment of the constitution
and the electoral law of 2008, as the women
faced pressure to define what form the quota
should take. Samia Al-Hashimi (2008), a lawyer
and activist reflects on this period:
The strong conflict that occurred between
women groups on the way in which women
should be included in the laws was an
important moment in the history of Sudanese
women. The government’s vision and that of
women affiliated to it was of a separate
women’s list, while the vision of the rest of
women was to include women on the same
lists as their parties.
Women activists, however, formed a voluntary
panel of seven gender experts and activists from
diverse political persuasions, and, supported by
the Frederich Ebert Foundation in Sudan, set
about to come up with a proposal with which
they could mobilise and influence government.
Their proposal was the following:
z A 30 per cent quota for women in composition
of the National Elections Commission, which
would be formed to oversee the elections, as
well as its state high elections structures
z A Quota in party lists at federal and state
level of no less than 30 per cent
z A clear mechanism to guarantee women’s
inclusion in the upper half of party lists, so as
to avoid their relegation to the bottom, and
ramifications against the parties were this not
to be adhered to. (Nourani 2009)
When the law was finally issued in 2008, it
included the quota, but not the form most
activists desired. The law stipulated the following:
Out of 450 seats in the National Assembly:
z 270 (60 per cent) would be filled by simple
majority to represent the geographic districts
in every state.
z 112 (25 per cent) would be filled through
separate and closed women’s lists at the level of
states, where each voter votes for one women’s
list only (and for the whole list as opposed to
specific individuals on it). For lists to qualify for
a seat they must receive no less than 4 per cent
of the vote. The seats designated to the
women’s lists shall then be allocated on the
basis of the number of votes obtained by each
list related to the strength of the seat after
excluding non-qualifying lists (those that did
not receive at least 4 per cent of votes). Finally,
assignment of the seats goes to candidates on
those qualifying lists in the order that their
names appear, from top to bottom.
z 68 (15  per cent) would be filled from party lists
based on proportional representation.
(National Elections Act 2008, Sudan, articles
29–33)
The law also stipulated a 25 per cent quota
through women’s lists at the state legislative
councils and the same in the South Sudan
Legislative Assembly (SSLA) (Nourani 2009).
The victory was bitter sweet. On the one hand, a
historic achievement had been made by Sudanese
women: for the first time, 25 per cent of seats at
the national and state levels would be filled by
women. On the other hand, the form the quota
took was seen by many activists as isolating
women within their parties, making separate lists
for them that would give parties little incentive to
nominate them in the ‘core’ geographic
constituencies or even party lists. The opposition
women termed the separate list ‘Hoesh al-Nisa’ –
(the women’s yard), referring to the traditional
division of space in the Sudanese home where
women have their own area in the house that they
are meant to stick to. They also feared that a
separate women’s list negotiated mainly through
parties would put them at the mercy of powerful
male brokers within the party, and that a situation
where lists competed against one another (i.e.
women competed against other women rather
than against candidates from both sexes) would
not be conducive to forming inter-party women’s
alliances and bringing into legislative bodies a
plurality of women’s voices and perspectives, since
lists would be party-based and since the dominant
list (i.e. dominant party in terms of votes) would
then dominate the allocated seats. 
5 The 2010 elections – early thoughts
The first Sudanese general elections took place
in April 2010, amidst much political turmoil,
accusations of fraud directed at the NCP, and a
political crisis that resulted in the boycotting of
the elections (at the very last minute) of most
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major opposition parties. Many of the fears of
women activists regarding the impact of the
form the quota took proved true. Preliminary
results show the NCP winning all 112 women’s
seats in parliament, and the majority of the state
legislative council seats (Al-Mubarak 2010).8 Not
a single woman in the North won seats through a
geographic constituency or a party list (see
Table 2), reflecting to a large extent the weak
representation in the nominations’ lists to begin
with.
The boycott by opposition parties makes it
difficult to evaluate whether the outcome would
have been the same had they participated in the
elections. In addition, the exclusion of large
segments of Darfur from the elections due to the
violence in parts of the region have meant that
millions of women of most need for advocates in
parliament were left without the opportunity to
make their voices heard. Because of the above
issues and the fact that the elections are not yet
over (Gezira State and South Kordofan, two
northern states, have had to delay their state
elections), it is difficult to make definitive
conclusions about the elections. But what we do
know is that the experience of women candidates
has raised a range of issues beyond the quota
that have had a critical impact on their
candidacies, and that have received much less
attention. These include an acute lack of funds
(in the case of women outside the ruling parties);
little know-how on how to form platforms and
run campaigns; few training opportunities; little
access to the media; difficulty in obtaining
critical information from electoral bodies
particularly in rural constituencies; intimidation
and harassment in some cases and continued
marginalisation within party structures and
processes in many others.
Most of the nominees had never had the
opportunity to vote in multi-party elections to
begin with, let alone run in an extremely
complex set-up whereby voters in the North cast
eight ballots and those in the south 12, under
conditions of widespread illiteracy. The voters
they were targeting for their part had been
absent from the polls for a long time, and many,
especially women, knew little about the process
of elections, and had little access to information
about most of the candidates; an issue of special
relevance to women candidates in terms of
building a voting constituency, as they tend to
have less resources to conduct door-to-door
campaigns and less access to the media. The
form that the quota has taken encourages
women to compete against one another, both
within their parties as well as against other lists.
Although the scenario presented above can be
read as negative, it is important to note that the
quota did have its achievements as well, which I
would argue go much further in their
implications for the women’s movement in Sudan
than the numbers entering legislative bodies in
2010. The most enduring legacy of the 2008
quota is likely to be the extent to which it
mobilised women to enter politics. Research by
Balghis Badri, a professor at Ahfad University
for Women in Khartoum, shows that the number
of women candidates in the 15 states of northern
Sudan reached 2,872 (National and State) (Badri
2010). A total of 112 will be entering this session
of the National Assembly, compared with only
two in 1986. In South Sudan overall, the female
representation has increased significantly (from
19 per cent to 31.76 per cent for SSLA, and from
22 per cent to 28.33 per cent for State
Assemblies (UNIFEM 2010).
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Table 2 Gender disaggregation of National Assembly Council seats won*
Men Women Total (%)
n (%) n (%)
Geographical 270 – 270 60
Women’s List – 112 112 25
Parties List 68 – 68 15
Total 338 75.1 112 24.9 450 100
*Data from the National Elections Commission gender advisor, unpublished as yet.
Source Al-Mubarak (2010).
6 The quota: done and dusted?
The history of northern Sudanese women’s
access to parliament reveals two interesting
trends. The first is that single party rule, under
military dictatorship in Sudan’s case, brought
women in much larger numbers to parliament,
mostly by guaranteeing them a set number of
seats. During the brief periods of multi-party
rule however, where access to parliament came
through the ballot, women’s only pathway to
legislative bodies came through specially
designated ‘graduate constituencies’, open to
women and other groups, mostly urban workers
and professionals, who without special provisions
would have had difficulty being elected in a
political scene dominated by sectarian parties
with large sway in the rural areas.
Parties were, and remain, reluctant to nominate
women in standard geographic constituencies,
from which the vast majority of candidates are
drawn. The mobilisation for a legislative quota
for women both before and after the historic
peace agreement of 2010 sought to learn from
the past and break with it by guaranteeing a
sizeable place at the table for Sudanese women
within multi-party democracy. 
Through much struggle, advocacy, research and
negotiation, they succeeded in pushing through a
quota in 2008 that is unprecedented in Sudan’s
history. The legacy of the quota is likely to be not
so much the increase in numbers, but the way in
which it mobilised Sudanese women and
propelled them into the political sphere. Their
failure, however, to unite in vision on what form
this quota should take, and the lack of influence
of women outside the ruling party on those
inside it, has left the women’s movement with a
quota system that is arguably non-conducive to
en-gendering political party structures and
processes, and that can encourage women to
divide rather than unite on a sorely needed
common agenda.
Beyond calls to reform the quota in light of the
experience of the 2010 elections, it is critical to
remember that the quota is designed as a
temporary measure. En-gendering political party
structures and electoral bodies, raising women’s
and men’s awareness about the contributions and
capacities of women for office, including the rural
areas where outreach has been key, are
imperative. While the quota battle in northern
Sudan was mainly fought in Khartoum (though
its impact was much wider), it is important to
reach out to women outside the large urban
centres and work with them on how best to
increase women’s political power in their areas.
Opportunity exists to tackle the above issue in
the coming few years at the level of local
government – which is likely to come under the
spotlight, regardless of whether unity or secession
is the choice of the people of southern Sudan. The
women’s movement, if it is to avoid the mistakes
of the transitional period, needs to mobilise early
and negotiate a common vision on how best to
increase women’s meaningful participation in
local government, whether at the local councils of
the mahaliyat (districts, or Payams in the South) or
at the level of the grassroots popular committees
that currently play no effective role in the
delivery of services and mobilisation of population
for development at the neighbourhood level.
Engaging other non-formal governance
structures in Sudan, most notably traditional and
religious authority is also key, as they continue to
play an important role in the allocation of power
and resources at the local level.
Moreover, the international community, which
bank-rolled the 2010 elections, was for the most
part late in funding training of women
candidates, civic and voter education efforts, and
capacity-building of domestic observers – all
elements of the electoral environment that if
strengthened can help the realisation of more
positive outcomes for women.
The women’s movement in Sudan, although not
always hand-in-hand, managed to reach a
common goal of the quota, although the form it
took was divisive. NCP women may not be the
most progressive, but the gender dynamics of the
Sudan mean that they are likely to face barriers
within parliament, regardless of political
affiliation. Little effort has been made to engage
them in a constructive way, and they have made
little effort to engage others. This has been a
weakness of the movement since this regime
took power, and it has hindered its effectiveness.
Finally, the continued restrictions on political
organisation and the continued hurdles on
democratic practice, despite the CPA, remain
important limits on women’s participation in
politics, in particular at the level of political
parties. The women’s movement cannot be
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divorced from the larger reality of the country,
which is that Sudan is a country between war and
peace, democracy and dictatorship, unity and
secession. What role the movement will play in
affecting this balance is yet unclear, much of it
will depend on whether it can negotiate its
differences and build on the momentum of the
quota – and how quickly.
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remain mine alone.
1 Legislative councils are state level councils
tasked with legislating at the state level and
governed by separate state constitutions.
2 Interview with Sara Nugd-Allah: member of
Umma Party leadership, 22 January 2010.
3 The author is aware that there are
discrepancies in the figures presented in
Table 1, however, in view of the paucity of data
in the Sudanese context, this is one of the few
sources available on trends and patterns of
political representation.
4 Interview, 4 October 2009, Khartoum.
5 Interview, 4 October 2009, Khartoum.
6 Interviews with Tayseer Al-Nourani, Nimat
Kuku, and Sara Nugd-Allah (4 October 2009;
19 October 2009 and 22 January 2010).
7 Interview, 21 June 2010.
8 Gezira and South Kordofan states are yet to
hold their state elections, which had to be
postponed.
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